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Pharos Enterprises did not deposit funds in its checking 
account at Commercial Security Bank pursuant to normal 
bank checking procedures in order to make the check good. 
Instead Pharos delivered a cashier's check for $16,500.00 
made payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" to Commercial 
Security Bank and instructed it to wire the money represented 
by the cashier's check to the payees in Idaho. Commercial 
Security agreed to wire the funds to "F. Robertson and C. 
Harrison". (R. 135, Tr. 56) During the transfer of 
funds, Commercial Security or its employees or agents chemged 
the designation of payees from "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" 
to F. Robertson or C. Harrison." (R. 135) Because of the 
change, C. Harrison was able to get the funds without Robertson's 
knowledge or consent (R. 135) and neither the funds nor 
Harrison can now be located. (Tr. 40-41, 43 and 46) 
In exchange for the cashier's check, Pharos received 
from appellant its own check which had been returned for 
insufficient funds. (Tr. 7, 61 and 75) This transaction 
was clarified at trial by the testimony of Mr. Mallacher as 
follows: 
Q. Mr. Mallacher . . . you stated twice 
your testimony that the check was purchased 
by Pharos. What did you mean when you said 
purchase by Pharos? 
A. Instead of Pharos applying some money 
to their account they merely gave us the 
money and picked up the check. 
Q . . . So that transaction didn't go through 
normal banking, checking channels, did it? 
A. No. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CARL HARRISON 
IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS LAWSUIT. 
The determination of whether a party is indispensable 
is one of equity and fairness. The primary consideration is 
whether the court can make an equitable adjudication without 
joinder of the absent party. The decision rests upon the 
balancing of two opposing policies. 3A Moore's Federal Practice 
1(19.07 [1] On one side is the desirability of a complete 
and final decree among all interested parties coupled with 
an interest in preventing multiple lawsuits. Opposing this 
is the desirability of allowing the parties some adjudication 
rather than leaving them remediless because of an ideal 
desire to have all interested persons before the court. Id. 
Following these principles, the Supreme Court has stated that, 
". . . there is no prescribed formula for determining in every 
case whether a person or a corporation is an indispensable 
party or not." Nites-Bement-Ponds Co. v. Iron Moulder's Union, 
254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920). 
The Utah rule on joinder of indispensable parties is 
a copy of the federal rule and is codified in Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It does not change the principles 
of indispensable parties developed by caselaw, but seeks to 
embody those concepts in a rule. 3A Moore's Federal Practice 
1(19.01 [1] and 19.01 [2] it reads as follows: 
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(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23 and of (b) of this rule, 
persons having a joint interest shall be 
made parties and be joined on the same side 
as Plaintiffs or Defendants. When a person 
who should join as a plaintiff refuses to 
do so, where his consent cannot be obtained, he 
may be made a defendant, or in proper cases, 
involuntary plaintiff. 
(b) EFFECT THE FAILURE TO JOIN. When persons 
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be 
parties if complete relief is to be accorded 
between those already parties, have not been 
made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the court as to service of process, the 
court shall order them summoned to appear 
in the action. The court in its discretion 
may proceed in the action without making such 
persons, parties, as such jurisdiction over 
them can be acquired only by their consent 
or voluntary appearance; but the judgment 
rendered therein does not affect the rights 
or liabilities of absent persons. 
Because the above rule does not clearly state the 
principles for joinder of indispensable parties, it was revised 
in 1966 and the revisions were adopted by the Federal Courts, 
Id. Utah has not yet adopted the 1966 revision but its 
language is applicable because it is a restatement of the law 
as developed under the original Rule. Id.. The federal rule 
states that a party is indispensable if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or 
(2) he claims an interest relating 
to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action 
in his absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any 
of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 
by reason of his claimed interest." 
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The striking similarity of this language to the 
holding of the following Utah Supreme Court case is not sur-
prising if it is remembered that the basis for the rule 
was founded on existing caselaw. In South Kamas Irrigation 
Co. v. Provo Water User Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d 851, 
852 (I960), the Utah Supreme Court held that a party is 
indispensable when: 
(1) the suit would have no direct affect between 
the parties before the court without joinder of the 
absent party, and 
(2) judgment against one of the parties could 
not be enforced without enforcing it against the absent 
party. 
The law developed above as applied to the facts of 
this case leads to the conclusion that Carl Harrison is not an 
indispensable party to this suit. The facts indicate that 
Pharos Enterprises gave the appellant, Commercial Security 
Bank, a cashier's check for $16,500.00 and instructed it to 
wire the funds to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" as joint 
parties. (Tr. 56 and 75) During the transmission of the wire, 
the "and" in the original instructions was changed by appellant 
or its agents (R. 127) to "or" enabling Harrison to get the 
wired funds without Robertson's knowkedge or consent. (Tr. 6) 
This suit is brought to recover for damages caused Mr. 
Robertson by appellant's improper transfer of funds. It is 
founded in negligence and the duty imposed on a bailee when 
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he fails to deal with the bailed property as instructed. 
It is a tort action and appellant admits this in the "Nature 
of the Case" section of its brief by stating that this is a 
suit to recover for negligence. Carl Harrison has no interest 
in this case as it is appellant's negligence not his that is 
in issue. A finding that Commercial Security Bank was negligent 
will not affect Mr. Harrison either way. 
Applying the requirements for an indispensable party 
as found in the revised Rule 19 clearly shows that Carl 
Harrison does not qualify. First, complete relief can be 
accorded between the existing parties in his absence. The 
duty of the appellant and the breach thereof by it or its 
agents does not involve Mr. Harrison. He was net responsible 
for the change in wording which enabled him to receive the 
wired funds without Robertson's knowledge. Perhaps Mr. Harrison 
will be held ultimately responsible for the loss with 
Commercial Security recovering indemnification from him, but 
that doesn't change the question of appellant's improper conduct 
and it is not in issue in this lawsuit. Second, the testimony 
at trial established that Mr. Harrison had no interest in 
the wired funds (R. 8 Tr. 8) He, therefore, has no interest 
which needs protecting or could be prejudiced by this lawsuit. 
Even if he had an interest in the funds, he has received the 
full $16,500.00 and cannot recover against appellant for its 
negligence or on any other theory. Furthermore, Appellant 
will not be prejudiced if Carl Harrison is not joined in this 
lawsuit. Appellant can still seek indemnification from 
Mr. Harrison for any amounts paid to Mr. Robertson. As between 
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Mr. Robertson, who is completely without fault, and Commercial 
Security Bank, the latter should suffer the consequences 
resulting if Mr. Harrison is not available or is judgment proof. 
If Mr. Harrison can be contacted as easily as appellant 
implies in its brief, why didn't Commercial Security Bank join 
him as a third party defendant rather than waiting for trial 
to bring up for the first time that he was an indispensable 
party and that the case should be dismissed? 
In addition to Rule 19, the guidelines laid down 
by the Utah Supreme Court in South Kamas establish that Carl 
Harrison is not an indispensable party. First, this suit does 
have a direct affect between the present parties without the 
joinder of Harrison. The issue presented is the negligence 
of Commercial Security. A finding can be made as to that 
and damages awarded without Harrison being made a party. 
Harrison was not an agent of Commercial Security. Neither 
was he employed by them. His actions do not enter into a 
determination of the negligence of Appellant. The second 
element of an indispensable party found in South Kamas is also 
missing as the judgment can be enforced against Commercial 
Security Bank without enforcing it against Mr. Harrison. 
As discussed earlier, Mr. Harrison is not responsible for the 
negligence of appellant. Judgment against Commercial Security 
for its negligence can therefore be enforced without enforcing 
it against Mr. Harrison. Mr. Harrison will not be required 
to pay the funds to Mr. Robertson. In fact, he will not 
even participate in the enforcement of the judgment against 
Commercial Security. 
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Appellantfs brief fails to analyze the law of indis-
pensable parties and apply it to the facts of the instant case 
as is required. Nites-Bement/ Supra. Instead it concludes 
that this case deals with the enforcement of a negotiable 
instrument made payable to joint payees by labelling it as 
such and then cites cases which state that joint payees are 
indispensable parties to the enforcement of the instrument. 
Also, the directed verdict for plaintiff was given on a 
negligence theory rather than one found under negotiable instrument 
law as that was the only one offered by plaintiff's counsel 
(Tr. 79). The problem with appellant's approach is that 
the facts do not coincide with its conclusion. If the 
original check made payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" 
which was returned for insufficient funds, had been deposited 
in an Idaho account and then shipped to Commercial Security 
Bank through banking channels, appellants characterization 
of the law and facts may have been correct. But such 
are not the facts. The record clearly shows that 
possession of the check was returned to Pharos Enterprises. 
(Tr. 75) It was not even presented to Commercial Security 
for payment. Pharos did not deposit funds in its Commercial 
Security checking account and write a new check or send the 
returned one to Idaho. Instead, it handed the equivalent of 
cash, a cashier's check for $16,500.00, to appellants officer 
and instructed him to wire it to Idaho. This suit was not 
brought to enforce the returned check on the cashier's check. 
It was brought for improper transfer of a cashier's check by 
wire. As such, appellant's arguments on indispensable parties 
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do not apply. 
Even assuming that the U.C.C. and negotiable instru-
ments law applies, Appellant has misconstrued the facts as 
the wired money was not made payable jointly but alternatively 
to "F. Robertson or C. Harrison." (Exhibits 4-D and 1-D) 
Because the funds were made payable in the alternative, all of 
the payees are not required to join in a suit for its enforce-
ment. U.C.A. 70A-3-116. In such a case, Carl Harrison would 
not be an indispensable party. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF. 
A directed verdict may properly be given pursuant 
to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when 
". . . there are no controverted issues of fact upon which 
reasonable men could differ," 5A Moore's Federal Practice 
1150.02 [1] or where there is a complete absence of proof 
as to a material issue to a defense or claim. Anderson v. 
Gribble, 20 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). The latter 
basis for directed verdict is merely a degree of the first 
as a complete absence of proof necessarily means that reasonable 
minds could not differ. 
The trial court did not error in granting a directed 
verdict for the Respondent because viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to appellant reveals that Commercial 
Security failed to meet its burden of proof by showing 
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that it was not negligent in the transfer of the wired funds. 
Not only did Commercial Security fail to meet its 
burden, but the record indicates a complete absence of 
proof by appellant as to due care or non negligent conduct. 
By way of contrast, the plaintiff-respondent offered evidence 
through an officer of Commercial Security showing that the 
improper transfer of funds would not have occurred if normal 
procedures had been used and that someone must have made a 
mistake, indicating negligence. (Tr. 51-61). 
The Rule established by the Utah Supreme Court is 
that a bailee being sued for destruction or loss of bailed 
property has the burden of showing that the loss was not 
caused by his negligence. Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 
239 P.2d 193 (1951); Romney v. Covey Garage, 100 Utah 167, 
11 P.2d 545 (1941); Clark-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling 
Aircraft, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 245, 408 P.2d 904 (1965). 
In Wyatt at 195, the Utah Court stated that they were aware 
of the difficulties facing a bailor or third party in trying 
to determine the cause of the loss and to offset that difficulty 
they held that the rule adopted earlier in Romney must be applied 
which places " . . . the burden [upon the] bailee to show 
that the damage or loss was not due to his negligence and he 
stands the risk of non-persuasion on this point." The court 
went on to say at 195 that, 
[I]n bailment cases for loss or destruction 
of, or damage to, the res, the law gives 
the bailor the "presumption" of negligence upon 
the part of the bailee which is sufficient 
to require a judgment in his favor as a matter 
of law unless the bailee presents some evidence 
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to show his freedom from negligence, and 
when in the face of such evidence by the 
bailee, the law continues an "inference" of 
negligence to be weighed by the trier of fact 
against bailee's evidence of non-negligence, 
as we hereafter more fully explain, it has 
given to the bailor all of the advantage which 
is required to place him on a parity with plaintiffs 
in other tort cases, without requiring the bailee 
at his absolute peril to affirmatively and 
specifically explain the cause of the loss or 
damage. 
The above rule applies to the instant case as the 
facts describe a bailment with Commercial Security as the bailee 
of funds. A bailment exists when personal property is 
delivered to another person for a particular prupose and after 
the purpose is fulfilled the property will be returned or 
dealt with as the bailor directs. H.S. Crocker; Co>^v* McFaddin, 
148 CA. 2d 639, 307 P.2d 429 (1957); 7 C.J.S. Bailments §1; 
Freeman v. Metro Transmission, Inc., 533 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1975). 
In the present case, Pharos Enterprises, as bailor, delivered 
personal property, a cashiers check, to Commercial Security 
Bank, as bailee, for the purpose of transferring the funds 
represented thereby, by wire to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" 
as joint payees. The funds were wired, but as to Mr. Robertson 
they were lost because the wire was made payable to the 
payees in the alternative enabling Carl Harrison to get 
the funds and take them for his own use without Mr, Robertson's 
knowledge. Because Commercial Security accepted the respon-
sibility of a bailee and the wired funds were lost, it has 
the burden of showing that the loss was not due to its negligence. 
Wyatt, supra. The record indicates that appellant failed 
to meet that burden of proof. In fact, there is a complete 
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absence of proof on that matter. In such a case the law 
gives Respondent a ". . . presumption of negligence on the 
part of the bailee which is sufficient to require a judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law. . . " Wyatt at 195. 
By giving judgment of directed verdict for respondent as a 
matter of law, the trial court was not abusing its discretion 
but was merely following Utah law. 
POINT III 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE 
FOR THE DAMAGES FLOWING FROM THE IMPROPER TRANSFER OF FUNDS. 
As a bailee, Commercial Security Bank is liable, 
even without a showing of negligence, for its transfer of the wired 
funds to C. Harrison rather than to "F. Robertson and C. 
Harrison" as directed by Pharos Enterprises. Potomac Insurance 
Co. v. Nickson, 65 Utah 395, 231 P.445 (1924); Kierce v. Farmers 
Bank, 174 Ky. 22, 191 S.W. 655 (1917). In Potomac Insurance 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a bailee is liable for 
conversion, even if he was not negligent, where he transfers 
the bailed property to the wrong person. In that case the 
bailor who was traveling on a trip left his car with the bailor 
for safe keeping overnight. When the bailor returned the next 
morning to pick up his car, it was no longer in the bailee's 
possession. At trial, the bailee defended by arguing that he 
was tricked into delivering the automobile to a thief who 
represented himself to be the true owner of the car by presenting 
what appeared to be an authentic receipt or claim ticket. 
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In response the Utah court held at 448: 
,f[W]hen the defendant received the 
[plaintiff's] car and issued its claim 
check, he, by virtue of that act, agreed to 
redeliver the car to the owner or to his 
order, and to no one else. . . . In 
delivering the car to [the thief], therefore, 
the defendant breached his contract, and 
hence the law does not inquire whether he 
did so in good faith or through negligence 
or otherwise. . . . [A]11 that the bailor 
is required to show is that the bailee has 
breached his contract by delivering the 
subject of the bailment to another without 
the consent of the bailor." 
Application of the above rule to the instant case 
requires a finding that defendant is liable for conversion. 
When Pharos Enterprises delivered the cashier's check to 
Commercial Security Bank and instructed it to wire the funds 
to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" a bailment was created. 
By so acting as a bailee, appellant agreed to deliver the funds 
to the payees named on the cashier's check. Potomac Insurance 
at 44 8. Appellant failed to deliver the funds as directed 
and it is liable for conversion even without a showing of 
negligence. The facts of the instant case are not unlike the 
situation where a depositer hands money to a bank teller and 
instructs him to place the money in the depositer's savings 
account. No one would dispute the fact that the bank and the 
teller would be responsible if the money was delivered to a 
third party who absconded with it. Neither should the 
liability of the bank be disputed here. It is required by 
Utah law. Potomac Insurance. Indeed, the facts of this case 
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are even stronger for application of the rule than those in 
Potomac Insurance because there the defendant was tricked 
into delivering possession to the wrong person. Here, the 
wrongful delivery was a direct result of the mistake of 
appellant or one of its agents. 
Commercial Security Bank is also liable for the 
loss of wired funds as to Respondent on a theory of negligence. 
As discussed earlier, appellant has the burden of showing 
that it was not negligence and it failed to meet that burden 
by offering no proof on the matter. Wyatt; Romney; and Clack-
Nomah. In addition, respondent is liable for the acts of its 
agents within the scope of their assigned duties. Naujoks v. 
Suhrmann, 9 Utah 2d 84, 337 P.2d 967 (1957); Majors v. 
Butler, 99 C.A. 2d 370, 221 P.2d 994 (1950); Burgess v. Security 
First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 44 C.A. 2d 808, 113 P.2d 298 
(1941). Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence 
by showing through the testimony of Appellant's officer that 
the mistake which enabled C. Harrison to get all of the funds 
had not occurred, to the officers knowledge, previously and 
would not have happened if normal banking procedures had been 
followed. (Tr. 55 and 60) Even without characterizing appellant 
as a bailee, the evidence on negligence offered by Respondent 
at trial was sufficient for a directed verdict in light of 
the fact that Commercial Security offered no evidence on 
that subject. Loer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566 (1967) The trial court did not error but correctly 
found Appellant liable for the damages caused by it or 
its agents. 
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In appellant's brief, he argues that payment to 
either of two joint payees is proper and lawful when the instru-
ment is signed by both. Appellant overlooks the fact that 
only one signature, C. Harrison's was given for receipt 
of the wired funds representing a cashier's check made 
payable to both "F. Robertson and C. Harrison." On the face 
of the transaction, only one signature was needed because the 
bank wire that reached Idaho was made payable in the alternative. 
Commercial Security, however, should not be allowed to argue 
that payment to one payee on his signature alone was proper 
when Commercial Security was the party responsible for the 
mistake enabling the funds to be paid to only one payee. 
Appellant's argument is again based on a 
misconstruction of the facts. It assumes that the issues 
of this lawsuit focus on payment of a check which was 
returned for insufficient funds. The facts clearly establish 
that such is not the case. The returned check was not even 
presented to Commercial Security bank the second time for 
payment. Instead, it was delivered to its maker, Pharos 
Enterprises. This lawsuit deals with the negligence of appellant 
in transferring funds. Respondents respectfully submit 
that the trial court correctly directed the verdict on that 
issue in their favor and ask that it be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Attorney for Respondent 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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